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THOUGHTS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DEATH: AN
APPRAISAL OF CALIFORNIA'S NATURAL DEATH
ACT
William J. Winslade*
California's Natural Death Act became effective January 1,
1977. It was the first legislation to be passed in the United States
that allows qualified patients to instruct their physician to
withhold medical procedures which would prolong life but pro-
vide no therapeutic benefits. After describing the Natural Death
Act, the author examines ambivalence toward death, limita-
tions on the use of the Act, and the Act's value as a symbolic
gesture and a social experiment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the confusion ... in which we are caught up, relying as we
must on one-sided information, standing too close to the great
changes that have already taken place or are beginning to, and
without a glimmering of the future that is being shaped, we
ourselves are at a loss as to the impressions which press in upon
us and as to the value of the judgements which we form.'
This passage was written by Freud about war in 1915. But it is
no less true about technology in 1977. Uncertainties, conflicts and
tensions generated by technological development pervade our
social and psychic life. We have begun to doubt whether humans
have the capacity to control and contain their technological crea-
tions. Seduced by false hopes that technology provides the key to
human conquest of nature, we are not only in danger of losing
control of technology, but also threatened with the prospect of
becoming unwilling prisoners of devices originally created to lib-
erate us. A prime example of this ironic consequence is that mod-
ern medical technology has provided us with unparalleled power
to prolong life while combating disease. Yet, at the same time, it
* Co-Director of the UCLA Program in Medicine, Law and Human Values and Lecturer
in Law and Psychiatry; Research Clinical Associate, Southern California Psychoanalytic
Institute; Ph.D., Northwestern University; J.D., UCLA; member of California Bar.
1. S. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death in 14 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 275 (1957).
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threatens to make us passive and mute victims of life support
systems which may postpone death indefinitely but not improve
health or restore functional life. This mixed blessing inevitably
gives rise to mixed feelings. It has begun to dawn on us that we
may win only a pyrrhic victory in the war against death.
In response to the problems created by technology's "artificial
prolongation of life beyond natural limits," the California legisla-
ture enacted the Natural Death Act.2 This statute details related
rights, responsibilities and legal procedures of patients and physi-
cians' in the context of terminal injury, illness or disease. This
article describes the Natural Death Act and then critically exam-
ines it from legal, political, psychological and philosophical
perspectives.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NATURAL DEATH ACT
For many persons, the idea of natural death is associated with
death with dignity, and the thought of dying in a hospital with
one's body connected to machines and tubes is frightening and
unnatural. It is difficult to forget the image of Karen Ann Quinlan
weighing only 70 pounds, locked into a fetal position and attached
to a respirator that kept her for months in a persistent vegetative
state. The prospect of a "natural" death, therefore, may seem
preferable to technological, artificial life. By calling this statute
the "Natural Death Act,"4 the California legislature apparently
sought to contrast natural death with mechanical, artificial pro-
longing of the dying process.'
2. The Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7185-7195 (West Supp. 1.977)
[hereinafter cited as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE]. See Appendix for full text of the Act.
3. At certain places in the statute, reference is made to licensed health professionals
other than physicians. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7190. For convenience, in
this article, references to physicians should be construed, where appropriate, to include
other licensed health professionals.
4, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7185.
5. The phrase "natural death" is often linked with dying with dignity and permitting
persons to die naturally. But just as removal from the respirator did not bring death to
Karen Ann Quinlan, so also the Natural Death Act does not guarantee death with dignity.
The absence of so-called artificial life-sustaining procedures does not, for example, provide
the loving, caring and companionship of other persons which can serve as an insulation
against the fear of loss of self and of relationships caused by death. At most, one particular
form of indignity-senseless bondage to technology-is prevented.
A more accurate name for the legislation would be the "Right to Refuse in Advance
[Vol. 26:717
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The legislative findings emphasize the right of adult persons to
control their own medical care decisions This fundamental right
is linked with the protection of individual human dignity as well
as the prevention of unnecessary pain and suffering of a person
in a terminal condition. The statute enables certain persons to
instruct their physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures when the use of such procedures would prolong life
but provide no medical benefits.7
Contrary to some misleading reports,' the Natural Death Act
neither establishes a "right to die" nor gives legal effect to a
"living will." 9 In addition, the statute expressly denies that it
authorizes mercy killing'0 or suicide." The legal rights granted by
the Natural Death Act do not guarantee a "natural death." Yet,
by expressly granting individual patients the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment,"2 the statute attempts to resolve uncertainty about
the legal status of the desires of terminally ill patients.
A. The Directive
One prescribed way for a person to give legal effect to the right
to refuse medical treatment in the event of a terminal condition
is to sign a document called a "Directive to Physicians."' 3 Al-
Useless Medical 'Treatment' in Certain Limited Circumstances Act." Given this verbose
alternative, the catchy but misleading "Natural Death Act" may have greater appeal.
This is especially true if one wishes to add a tone of legitimacy to legislation that seems,
in a sense, to favor death over life. In dealing with such a sensitive issue, it is not surprising
that the legislature adopted a name designed to evoke a favorable response against inhu-
man, "unnatural" machinery.
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7186.
7. Id. §7188.
8. See, e.g., Holles, Law Goes Into Effect in California Giving the Terminally Ill the
Right to Die by Barring Medical Aid, N.Y.Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at 32. In this article, Holles
mistakenly calls the directive to physicians a "living will."
9. Although several versions of the so-called "living will" exist, none have been recog-
nized as legally valid. Nevertheless, several hundred thousand such documents have been
signed in recent years. The living will documents typically are cast in vague and expansive
terms creating even more difficult problems of interpretation than the Natural Death Act.
But the most important difference, for legal purposes, is that the Directive to Physicians
is a document which enables a person to exercise a legal right to refuse medical treatment.
A living will is, at best, only an expression of a person's desires.
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7195.
11. Id. §7192(a).
12. Id. §7188.
13. Id.
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though any adult may sign a directive, it is valid only if such a
person is of "sound mind," "understands the full import" of the
directive and is "emotionally and mentally competent" at the
time of the signing. 4 The standard of competence required under
the statute is not further specified.
Of those persons who sign a directive, an important distinction
is made between qualified and nonqualified patients. To be
"qualified," a patient must be "diagnosed and certified in writing
to be afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one
of whom shall be the attending physician, who have personally
examined the patient."'" The physician is legally obligated to
carry out or cause to be carried out the valid directive of a quali-
fied patient in appropriate circumstances. 6 A valid directive of a
nonqualified patient, however, has relevance only as "evidence of
a patient's directions regarding the withholding or withdrawing
of life-sustaining procedures" to which a physician "may give
weight" along with other relevant factors. 7
A directive in the form prescribed by the statute must be dated,
appropriately filled in, and signed by the person making a direc-
tive in the presence of two witnesses. 8 A valid directive so exe-
cuted remains in effect for five years. 9 It serves as an instrument
for refusing treatment only if a patient "becomes comatose or is
rendered incapable of communicating with the attending physi-
cian.' 0 If a patient subsequently regains the ability to communi-
14. Id.
15. Id. § 7187(e).
16. Id. §7191(b).
17. Id. § 7191(c).
18. Id. §7188. The statute sets forth precise requirements for witnessing the directive.
The directive must be signed by the patient
in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by blood or marriage
and who would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon
his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then existing or,
at the time of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In addition, a
witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee of the
attending physician or a health facility in which the declarant is a patient, or
any person who has a claim against any portion of the estate of the declarant
upon his decease at the time of the execution of the directive.
Id. In addition, special witness requirements apply to patients in nursing homes. Id.
§7188.5.
19. Id. §7189.5.
20. Id.
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cate, the directive is no longer deemed the "final expression" of
the patient's "legal right to refuse medical or surgical proce-
dures.""1
Although it is difficult to satisfy the eligibility requirements
and prescribed procedures for executing a valid directive, revoca-
tion at any time is easily accomplished. The patient may revoke
by destroying the directive or by communicating to the attending
physician a written or even a verbal revocation.22
It should be noted that signing a directive is only one way in
which persons may give legal effect to their desires concerning the
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures. 23 No
one can be required to sign a directive as a condition of receiving
health care or health insurance, and signing a directive shall not
impair in any respect existing life insurance or one's right to
obtain life insurance.24
B. The Obligations of Physicians
The statute requires that two physicians diagnose a terminal
condition and certify it in writing to the patients. The physicians
must find:
an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness,
which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining proce-
dures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce
death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures
serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient.2
However, the statute is silent as to whether a physician must
disclose a diagnosis of a terminal condition if the patient ex-
pressly waives the right to know the diagnosis.
Prior to carrying out the instructions of a directive, the attend-
ing physician must determine if it is valid.2 The physician must
21. Id. §7188.
22. Id. §7189.
23. Id. §7193. Although the legislature explicitly states that the Natural Death Act is
cumulative and does not restrict relevant pre-existing rights to refuse treatment, it is
unclear what those rights are. Presumably this legislation was needed also because of
uncertainties about procedures for exercising such rights.
24. Id. §7192(b).
25. Id. §7187(f).
26. Id. §7191(a). See notes 65-66 and accompanying text infra.
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determine if all formalities were satisfied, especially the require-
ment of qualified witnesses. In addition, the physician must
assess the patient's competence at the time the directive is to
be put into effect. If the patient is competent and able to com-
municate, the physician must again confirm that the patient
still desires the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures. The statute implies that a physician who withholds or
withdraws life-sustaining procedures pursuant to an invalid
directive could be liable criminally for homicide or civilly for
wrongful death. 7
If a qualified patient has executed a valid directive, then the
attending physician must determine if "death is imminent
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized."2 This cri-
terion is quite restrictive because life-sustaining procedures may
not be withheld or withdrawn if they will postpone death beyond
the period of imminence.29 Life-sustaining procedures may be
withheld or withdrawn when they would postpone the actual
moment of death,3 but they cannot be withheld or withdrawn if
they would postpone death for a long time.
If an attending physician has a qualified patient who has exe-
cuted and not revoked a valid directive, whose death is imminent
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, and who
either reaffirms the directive or is unable to communicate, then
the attending physician has a duty to effectuate the directive.
Although the duty is purportedly a legal obligation, a physician
cannot be held liable either criminally or civilly for failure to
carry out such a directive. It is, however, considered unprofes-
sional conduct for a physician not to comply with the directive
or transfer the qualified patient to a physician who will carry out
the directive.3'
If a person was not a qualified patient when a valid directive
was executed and has not subsequently reexecuted a valid direc-
27. Id. §7190.
28. Id. §§7187(c), 7188.
29. To illustrate, assume that "imminence" is defined as a period of time less than X
and that, without the use of life-sustaining procedures, a patient would die in a period of
time less than X. If life-sustaining procedures would prolong life for a period of time
greater than X, then they may not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to the directive.
30. Id. §§7187(c), 7187(f), 7188.
31. Id. §7191(b).
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tive at least 14 days after becoming a qualified patient, then such
a directive is not legally binding on the physician. The physician
may consider the directive as evidence of the patient's wishes;"
however, the statute does not indicate whether it is deemed un-
professional conduct not to effectuate the invalid directive even
when circumstances justify it. The most plausible reading of this
provision seems to be that in such a case a physician is permitted
but not required to effectuate the directive.
HI. APPRAISAL OF THE NATURAL DEATH ACT
A. Ambivalence Toward Death and Technology
Because others have reviewed some of the "politics of natural
death, '33 this Article will call attention to only one aspect of its
social psychology. The emotions provoked by public discussion of
the Natural Death Act in 1976 3 ranged on a spectrum from hos-
tile accusations that the proposed law opened the door to geno-
cide and involuntary euthanasia to uncritical praise that it would
guarantee death with dignity and the right to die. Such extreme
reactions are not surprising in view of the powerful and deep
conflicting feelings aroused by the technological war against
death.
In view of the discomfort and perplexity expressed in judicial
opinions pertaining to death and dying, as well as mounting pub-
lic pressure, legislative action is understandable. But legislatures
are notoriously impatient; passing something at least appears to
remove uncertainty and indecision.3 5 The Natural Death Act rep-
32. Id. §7191(c).
33. See, e.g., Garland, Politics, Legislation and Natural Death, 1976 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 5.
34. Earlier, in 1974, Assemblyman Barry Keene introduced a one-sentence bill which
read as follows: "Every person has the right to die without the prolongation of life by
medical means." Although hearings were held on this bill, it did not survive preliminary
legislative review.
35. The notoriety created by the Karen Ann Quinlan case and other issues related to
life and death in medicine, such as the definition of death, organ transplantation and
abortion, gave impetus to a bill called the "Natural Death Act," introduced by Assembly-
man Keene on February 13, 1976. By the end of the summer of 1976, after much political
and public debate, the Natural Death Act had been amended nine times. Nevertheless,
it was passed by the California legislature by a substantial majority. During the month
of September, Governor Brown, while deliberating about whether to sign the bill, refused
1977]
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resents a sincere effort to solve what appears to many to be an
intractable problem. And for some persons the new law might, at
least initially, provide psychological relief and eliminate the un-
easiness associated with the fear of dying enslaved to medical
machinery.
Going beyond legislative impatience and judicial discomfort, '
perhaps the Natural Death Act engendered so much controversy
and confusion because it touches a deeply rooted but volatile
ambivalence37 towards death itself. Death, and preoccupation if
not obsession with it, is complicated in our age by our anxiety
about technology. One explanation for this obsession, in the
words of the late Ernest Becker, is that
the idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like
nothing else; it is a mainspring of human actitity - activity
designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by
denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man.3"
to discuss it publicly. On September 30, 1976, three hours before the bill would have
become law without the Governor's signature, he signed the bill.
36. L. Rothenberg, Demands for Life and Requests for Death: The Judicial Dilemma
(Feb. 25, 1977) (unpublished paper presented at the National Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science).
37. Although ambivalence is deeply rooted in human experience, the word
"ambivalence" was not coined until early in the twentieth century. This is not wholly
surprising, for often the most fundamental and pervasive features of the human condition
are taken for granted rather than identified and analyzed. Over sixty years after Eugen
Bleuler first labeled the phenomenon of ambivalence and after Freud and others further
analyzed it, the word "ambivalence" has, in some ways, become all too familiar. It has
become what Fowler in Modern English Usage calls a "popularized technicality," a word
which has been used so widely and loosely that its descriptive value has been all but lost.
This, too, is not surprising, for often words which capture a very important feature of
experience are soon corrupted. There is a natural tendency to generalize an insight exten-
sively beyond the point of illumination, to make too much of a good thing. Because
"ambivalence" has been overused and stretched beyond proper limits, the concept of
ambivalence often is combined with concepts such as ambiguity, indecision, and, in
general, mixed feelings. The close connections among these concepts often degenerates
into conceptual confusion.
Nevertheless, for present purposes it is possible to concentrate on what is characteristic
of the phenomenon of ambivalence without attempting to analyze the concept fully.
"Ambivalence" etymologically comes from "ambi" which means both and "valens" (the
present participle of "valere") which means, literally, to be strong. Note also the link to
"valence" which means, broadly, the capacity of something to unite, react, or interact
with something else. This suggests the connection with mixed feelings. In this article
"ambivalence" can be characterized roughly as the coexistence in a person of unresolved
conflicting feelings which are strong and long lasting, concern matters of importance and
have a significant impact on a person.
38. E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH ix (1974).
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The idea of death is ubiquitous-at the beginning and throughout
life, not only at its end.
The topic of death both frightens and fascinates us. Most peo-
ple would rather turn away from and try to ignore the terminally
ill; yet the fate of Karen Ann Quinlan became, for a time, an
addicting drama. We deplore murder, but we romanticize and
publicize institutionalized killing called the death penalty.39 In
debates about abortion or the tragic newborn,40 some passionately
plead for the right to life while others argue fervently against it.
Uncertainty and disagreement are rampant even about such fun-
damental issues as the definition of death.
Freud believed that a "conflict due to ambivalence" about
death arises when "two opposing attitudes toward death, the one
which acknowledges it as the annihilation of life and the other
which denies it as unreal, collide and come into conflict."', We
consciously and intellectually acknowledge that our own death is
inevitable, but unconsciously and emotionally find it difficult to
accept. Even if, as the research of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross sug-
gests, persons often pass through various emotional stages in their
attitudes toward their own impending death-denial, rage, bar-
gaining, depression and acceptance-there is also the underlying
presence of hope.2 The fact of death, one's own or that of others,
can be mastered in many ways: confronted realistically, experi-
39. The newspaper publicity of Gary Gilmore's execution is one example. See New York
Times, Jan. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
40. Recently the popular media has evidenced a strong interest in the issue of whether
the country's medical resources should be employed to prolong the life of grossly retarded
infants or those with severe multiple birth defects. Many doctors are refusing to save such
infants, emphasizing the inferior quality of the life they could expect to lead even if they
were saved. These doctors have chosen not to preserve life at any cost and under any
condition. A study conducted in the early seventies at Yale-New Haven Hospital, recently
cited by Time Magazine and the Washington Post, reveals that of the 299 deaths ana-
lyzed, 43 of the deformed infants died because doctors and parents decided to discontinue
medical treatment. Few cases concerning these issues have been the subject of legal action
and, at present, there is no indication how the courts will rule on the question of withhold-
ing medical treatment from the malformed infants. See The Hardest Choice, TIME, March
25, 1974, at 84; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, Nov. 7,
1976, at 26, col. 2.
41. S. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death in 14 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOL-
OGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 298 (1957). Although Freud was speaking here of a
person's response to the death of a loved one, an analogous point may be made about one's
own death.
42. E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING passim (1969).
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enced emotionally or analyzed exhaustively. No matter how an
individual prepares for death, however, one is inescapably ambi-
valent toward it.43
Perhaps this helps to explain why the procedures for executing
a valid directive are so demanding and yet the directive is so
easily revoked. Ambivalence tends to produce a fluctuation of
feelings. At one moment a person might long for death and in the
next moment cling to life. The Natural Death Act mirrors the
underlying theme of ambivalence toward death.
B. Limitations on Use of the Natural Death Act
1. Inadequate information and education are limiting
No provision is made in the Natural Death Act to make copies
of the directive readily available or to provide for dissemination
of information about the new law. The office of Assemblyman
Keene, the bill's original sponsor, has responded to well over 1,000
personal requests for directives. This is clearly not the most effi-
cient method to meet the needs of persons who might wish to sign
one. It is reported that the failure to include provisions in the
statute for dissemination of information was a mere oversight by
the legislators." But one might also wonder whether the apparent
oversight reveals an unconscious desire to make it difficult to
exercise the statutorily-created rights of terminally ill patients.
Likewise, it is not clear who, if anyone, has the responsibility
to educate the adult population about their rights pursuant to the
Natural Death Act. Physicians and hospitals cannot advise pa-
tients adequately about their rights until the doctors have been
educated themselves. But most busy physicians and other health
professionals are not going to be enthusiastic about studying the
fine details of the statute. Even if they do learn the specifics of
the new law, they will be cautious about appearing to promote
43. This is not to deny that many other attitudes, beliefs and behaviors are associated
with death. Individuals, institutions and cultures may cope with their ambivalence in a
variety of ways. For example, awareness of the fact of death may be repressed and the
fear of it unrecognized; until the last minute this was the response of Ivan Ilyich in
Tolstoy's famous story. Death, or the threat of death, may be confronted as a limit that
gives greater meaning to life. My point is simply that ambivalence about death, regardless
of how one responds to it, is pervasive and persistent.
44. Scarr, New 'Right-to-Die' Bill Lacks an Elemental Part, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 1, 1977.
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and encourage persons to sign a directive. And they will still be
faced with difficult decisions about how to advise their patients.
Perhaps lawyers should educate the public about its rights
under the Natural Death Act. But lawyers, like physicians, need
to be educated about the relevant medical considerations, the
psychological aspects of terminal illness and dying, and technical
problems with the statute and the directive. A cautious lawyer
very well might increase the uncertainty of a client seeking advice
about whether to sign a directive or of a physician about his
responsibilities and liabilities.
Many physicians, especially those who identify strongly with
the ideal of preserving life, might feel uncomfortable about en-
couraging the use of directives. Medical insurance companies
might not. Indeed, it is clearly in the economic interest of health
insurance companies to avoid payment for useless life-sustaining
procedures which only prolong the dying process. One can imag-
ine cynically that insurance companies might give a discount to
persons who execute a valid directive to physicians. Nothing in
the statute precludes such an enticement.
Hospitals, on the other hand, might have mixed reactions. Pro-
longing the dying process of terminally ill patients increases reve-
nues and requires only caretaking activities. Yet, an image of
hospitals as technological depositories for unconscious, semi-
human organisms is depressing to staff who desire to perform
medical work that has a beneficial outcome.
If terminally ill patients do not sign or freely revoke directives,
and if physicians are reluctant to withhold or withdraw useless
life-sustaining procedures in the absence of a valid directive,
then it is possible that more rather than fewer persons will suffer
the indignity of a technological prolongation of the dying process.
This possibility magnifies the need for adequate information and
education about the Natural Death Act.
2. Unclear terminology is limiting
The major problem with the name of the law is that it rests
upon and promotes a conceptual confusion contained in the arti-
ficial/natural distinction. The mistake is to suppose that the term
"natural" death clarifies anything. The important issue is not the
artificial prolonging of life by medical intervention, but the fact
that our capacity to prolong life exceeds our capacity to cure. It
1977]
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is not prolonging life beyond natural limits but prolonging life
"while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the
patient"4" that is objectionable. Useless procedures disguised as
medical "treatment" are the true target of dissatisfaction. To talk
about the "natural limits" of life only obscures the central prob-
lem of maintaining human control over the use of often inade-
quate medical technology. The artificial/natural distinction cre-
ates further difficulties in connection with definitions of other key
terms.
The definitions of certain essential terms in Section 7187 have
two primary purposes: to clarify key concepts and to restrict the
scope of the Natural Death Act. The former goal is not achieved
fully because one important definition remains unclear. The stat-
ute defines "life-sustaining procedure" as follows:
any medical procedure or intervention which utilizes mechani-
cal or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a
vital function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death and
where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death is
imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-
sustaining procedure" shall not include the administration of
medication or the performance of any medical procedure
deemed necessary to alleviate pain."
An initial problem is that the scope of the term "mechanical
or other artificial means" is not clear. Although one naturally
thinks of a respirator,47 does the definition also include, for exam-
ple, chemicals used to maintain the functioning of certain organs
or intravenously administered fluids, such as glucose or vitamins,
which provide nourishment? Such interventions arguably employ
mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore or sup-
plant a vital function. Yet they are neither medication nor meth-
ods of alleviating pain. While most physicians might agree that
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7186.
46. Id. §7187(c).
47. The legislature considered primarily, if not exclusively, respirators as the artificial
means of prolonging life. In an early version of the bill introduced on February 13, 1976,
respirators were mentioned specifically as an illustration of an artificial life-sustaining
procedure. However, the reference to respirators was deleted from the final version of the
bill.
[Vol. 26:717
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the legislative definition includes both respirators and intrave-
nous feeding devices, few currently think of them in the same
terms. For example, the doctors in the Karen Ann Quinlan case
disagreed about whether the respirator was a useless procedure
which should be discontinued. But no one proposed to remove the
intravenous nourishment, even though it was useless as a thera-
peutic measure. Perhaps the reasons for this difference of attitude
towards such procedures are psychological rather than logical."
In this respect the open legislative definition may provide needed
flexibility. 9
Unfortunately, another phrase in the definition raises addi-
tional problems of interpretation. The Natural Death Act pro-
vides that life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or with-
drawn only when "death is imminent whether or not such proce-
dures are utilized." 0 This qualifying phrase not only drastically
limits the general scope of the Natural Death Act, but it also
raises particular problems about the use of respirators. If death
can be postponed beyond the period of imminence, then the Nat-
ural Death Act is inapplicable. Even on a broad reading of
"imminence," the use of respirators often can prolong breathing
and other vital functions for a long period of time. As a result,
the imminence criterion excludes from the scope of the act some
of the most problematic cases. For example, an automobile acci-
dent victim who has severe brain damage and is in a coma with
no hope of recovery might be maintained indefinitely by artificial
life-sustaining procedures. Thus, the Natural Death Act may in-
crease rather than decrease the use of respirators even when they
provide no medical benefits.
In addition, medical opinions concerning the imminence of
death vary widely and are not always reliable." Because physi-
48. Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1,
16 (1976).
49. The lack of specificity of the legislation accommodates future possible changes, but
it is likely that current medical practices will not be affected immediately by the new
statutory language.
50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7187(c).
51. We need only recall the testimony of physicians in In re Quinlan that if Karen Ann
Quinlan were to be removed from the respirator, her death would be imminent. In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (1976). This was in early June, 1976. She was
removed from the respirator and, as of this writing, she, or at least her body, is still alive.
1977]
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cians are often mistaken, they are likely to be cautious about
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining procedures. Although
caution is normally commendable in medical care, in this context
it will restrict further the practical application of the Natural
Death Act.
3. Eligibility requirements are limiting
The requirements for executing a valid directive also severely
restrict the applicability of the Natural Death Act. Each of the
main eligibility requirements for becoming a qualified pa-
tient-adulthood, competence, terminal condition-narrows the
class of persons who may execute a valid and legally binding
directive. The pregnancy clause adds still another limiting condi-
tion.*
Adulthood does not appear at first to be a particularly objec-
tionable eligibility condition. This provision does, however, raise
some technical as well as practical questions. Does the statute
exclude children simply because they are presumed to be incom-
petent? If the right to refuse useless medical treatment is a funda-
mental personal right, should a competency presumption be con-
clusive or rebuttable? The Natural Death Act adopts the policy
of a conclusive presumption for it does not permit children to sign
a directive much less count as qualified patients. Perhaps a more
realistic and sensitive response to children, especially older and
mature children, might be to permit them to sign a directive to
express their desires; however, its status might be similar to that
of a nonqualified patient, only relevant evidence to be considered
by a physician but not a legally binding document."
52. The pregnancy clause precludes women diagnosed as pregnant from executing a
valid directive during the course of their pregnancy. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7188(3).
It is obvious that due process, equal protection and privacy rights flowing from the recent
plethora of cases concerning women's rights, and especially the abortion cases, raise con-
siderable doubts about the constitutionality of this clause. Moreover, since a nonviable
fetus is not recognized as a person under California law, People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App.3d
896, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976), it is not clear whose rights are being protected by this
clause, at least with respect to a woman in the early stages of pregnancy.
. 53. One might also wonder whether the automatic exclusion of children from the pur-
view of the Natural Death Act will exacerbate an existing dilemma about the treatment
of children with terminal conditions. It is psychologically more difficult for parents and
physicians to give up hope for the cure of children in contrast to adults. It is tempting,
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The competence requirement is another troublesome issue be-
cause different standards of competence govern informed consent
to medical treatment. A lesser degree of competence is required
to consent to medical treatment than to refuse treatment.54
Typically, if a person consents to a medical treatment which is
generally accepted as useful for the patient's condition, compe-
tence to give consent is not questioned. It is only when a person
wishes to refuse useful medical treatment that competence is
likely to be questioned and a higher standard employed. How-
ever, the question of competence in the context of the Natural
Death Act is interesting because, on the one hand, it concerns
refusal of treatment; on the other hand, it is a refusal of useless
treatment. Should the standard of competence be the higher
standard normally associated with refusal of treatment, or a
lower standard because useless rather than useful treatment
is being refused? To the limited extent that the competence
requirement is articulated in the statute, it seems to favor the
higher standard of competence required for refusal of treatment.
A second aspect of the competency requirement is that a person
must "understand the full import"55 of a directive. One might
wonder whether anyone has the capacity to meet this high stan-
dard. It is particularly problematic whether a qualified pa-
tient-who has been notified in writing of his or her impending
death-has the capacity to grasp fully the technical concepts and
legal jargon contained in the directive. It is more likely that a
person who signs a directive in good health, a nonqualified pa-
tient, will understand the full import of a directive." The compe-
therefore, to employ more radical therapies as well as technological life-sustaining proce-
dures in treating children.
Although parents are permitted to consent to treatment for their children, the parents'
right to refuse treatment on their children's behalf is much less clear. As a practical
matter, informal agreements to discontinue useless and painful treatment are sometimes
made between parents and physicians. But the restrictions implied by the Natural Death
Act might discourage such agreements, however humane they might be. For the Natural
Death Act might be taken to imply that parents are not permitted to refuse even useless
medical treatment for their children. Contrary to the objectives of this legislation, this
may very well cause unnecessary pain and suffering to children as well as to parents and
physicians.
54. Roth, Maisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7188(6).
56. It is particularly ironic that a directive executed by a nonqualified patient is not
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tence requirement further constricts the utilization of the Natural
Death Act by requiring determinations of the patient's compre-
hension and competence to refuse treatment at a time when the
patient is especially vulnerable to emotional instability.
The third eligibility requirement, the diagnosis and written
certification of a terminal condition, is neither a pleasant pros-
pect for a patient nor an attractive task for a physician. Although
the definition of "terminal condition"57 at first glance appears to
be very broad, it is not clear whether or when the physician may
or must inform the patient. Does the physician inform the patient
of the terminal condition as soon as it is diagnosed or when the
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to post-
pone the moment of death? If physicians are hesitant in making
their diagnoses, then patients may not be informed soon enough
to fulfill the fourteen-day waiting period required before execut-
ing a valid directive. But if physicians are precipitous in making
diagnoses of terminal conditions, patients may become alarmed
needlessly and may suffer unnecessary anxiety.
Physicians are cautious about diagnosing terminal conditions;
they are likely to be especially circumspect about certifying a
diagnosis of a terminal condition in writing. Although some con-
ditions warrant a terminal diagnosis, most medical diagnoses are
inherently fallible because physicians can err, and patients can
experience spontaneous remissions. Also, some physicians believe
that a written diagnosis of a terminal condition might be psychol-
ogically damaging58 and anti-therapeutic. In the face of a diagno-
legally binding. For the individual autonomy of this large class of healthy and presumably
competent adults is given less legal backing than the class of terminally ill qualified
patients. To give maximum legal effect to a directive for nonqualified patients would
decrease the need for the fourteen-day waiting period, decrease the administrative and
judgmental responsibilities of physicians, and truly uphold the ideal of individual auton-
omy in more than a token way.
57. The Natural Death Act defines "terminal condition" as follows:
an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of
the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical
judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining proce-
dures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7187(f).
58. In response to this line of reasoning, it could be argued that the requirements of the
Natural Death Act allow persons to confront directly the harsh reality of death. Instead
of denying death and encouraging self-deception, perhaps we should "give death the place
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sis of a terminal condition, patients and physicians alike may give
up hope. Moreover, terminally ill patients may often be the least
well-treated by physicians and other hospital staff. Despite the
valuable pioneering work of Elisabeth Kdbler-Ross and of the
Hospice movement,59 most medical personnel are unsure about
how to respond to dying patients. Determination of "terminal
condition," required by the Natural Death Act, very well may
increase both the alienation of the dying patient and the neglect
by hospital personnel and the patient's family.
4. Procedural requirements are limiting
Bureaucratic burdens placed upon patients and physicians by
the Natural Death Act tend to further restrict the right to refuse
medical treatment. The expression of this right becomes an
empty gesture and hollow rhetoric"° because procedures do not
facilitate the exercise of the right. Instead, undue restrictions
curtail the patient's right to control medical decisions.
The directive states that fourteen days must have elapsed be-
tween the notification of the terminal condition and the signing
of the directive.' Presumably, this is to prevent impulsive reac-
tions to a notification of a terminal condition. However, the
fourteen-day clause is both an inconvenient and unnecessary pro-
cedural burden. It is inconvenient because it adds another admin-
istrative formality to the directive. It is unnecessary because the
directive can be revoked easily in a variety of ways.
The witness clause presents yet another procedural obstacle."2
in reality and in our thoughts which is its due." S. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War
and Death in 14 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 299 (1957).
However, even if one agrees with Freud that we must prepare ourselves for death, id.
at 300, it does not necessarily follow that we need or wish to be informed in writing by
our physician that we have a terminal condition. A person might be willing to sign a
Directive to Physicians but not wish to be informed that he or she is afflicted with a
terminal condition. The Natural Death Act may in effect force a person to be informed of
something he or she does not want to know in order to exercise a fundamental right.
59. Hospices, which originated in England, were established as centers to care for and
alleviate the pain of the terminally ill. Patients at such centers receive no therapeutic
treatment aimed at "cure." Currently, there are approximately forty such centers in the
United States.
60. For an elaboration of this general theme, see Winslade, The Juvenile Courts: From
Idealism to Hypocrisy, 3 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAC. 181 (1975).
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7188.
62. Id.
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A variety of persons who might ordinarily serve as witnesses to
the directive are excluded on the grounds that they are poten-
tially interested parties, many with possible economic interests in
a patient's estate. By extending this exclusion even to hospital
staff and other patients, the statute makes it difficult for the
terminally ill patient to obtain witnesses. While it is understand-
able that interested parties should not serve as witnesses to the
directive, other costs of this restriction should be noted. A patient
will be required to disclose his terminal condition to at least two
persons. This requirement may offend the patient's sensibilities,
constitute an undesired exposure of personal matters, or increase
psychological suffering to an extent that some patients might
choose not to sign a directive.
While the bureaucratic responsibilities placed on patients are
minimal, the administrative tasks imposed on physicians are
substantial." The statute provides that:
the attending physician shall determine that the directive com-
plies with Section 7188 requirements for executing a valid Direc-
tive and, if the patient is mentally competent, that the directive
and all steps proposed by the attending physician to be under-
taken are in accord with the desires of the qualified patient. 4
0
Physicians must, in effect, act as lawyers in order to ascertain
whether a directive complies with the law in all respects-a com-
plicated determination for someone without legal training. Even
if patients are not discouraged from signing directives, physicians
may be reluctant to accept them. The administrative burdens as
well as the potential legal liability for mistakes that might be
made in determining the validity of a directive is an unwelcome
burden to place on physicians or other hospital administrative
63. Prior to the passage of the Natural Death Act, as the legislative findings point out,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7186, physicians were in doubt as to whether it was legally
permissible to withdraw or withhold non-beneficial medical procedures in accordance with
a patient's wishes. Of course, that uncertainty will remain for all those persons who, for
whatever reason, do not execute a Directive to Physicians. In fact, it might become more
risky for physicians to withhold or withdraw useless medical procedures for terminal
patients who have not executed a directive. With the formalization of this aspect of the
physician-patient relationship, which may subject it to greater legal scrutiny, many physi-
cians might be reluctant to make medical decisions to discontinue worthless treatment
for fear of legal liability.
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7191(a).
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staff.
In addition, the attending physician must determine when
a directive should be implemented. This requires the physician
to interpret certain technical language of the statute which lacks
clear legal or medical meaning, or at best is difficult to apply. The
vagueness of the terms "life-sustaining procedure," "moment of
death," "mechanical or other artificial means," "death is immi-
nent, " "nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient,"
"sound mind," and "emotionally and mentally competent" are
the most obvious examples. It is difficult enough for responsible
physicians to make sound medical decisions; they are now being
required to make both legal judgments as well as subtle linguistic
analyses.
Another serious problem which imposes new decisionmaking
responsibilities upon physicians concerns directives executed by
nonqualified patients. If such a person later becomes a qualified
patient and has not formally reexecuted a directive in accordance
with all technical requirements, the original directive is not le-
gally binding. It need be given only "some weight" by the physi-
cian who must apply a vague totality of the circumstances test.6"
This provides little guidance for the attending physician. In an
era of defensive medicine, the cautious physician threatened by
medical malpractice charges is not likely to give much weight to
a non-binding directive.
The bureaucratic burdens created by the Natural Death Act
can be understood by analogy to familiar debates about voluntary
euthanasia laws. Many who do not object to voluntary euthanasia
on moral or religious grounds typically oppose proposed legisla-
tion because of the difficulty of administering it without error or
overreaching.66 A similar concern arises about the restrictions and
qualifications of the Natural Death Act. Unregulated individual
freedom may leap into irrationality; but excessive regulations
produce a quagmire of bureaucratic paternalism. The restriction
of individual freedom is derived from a belief that humans are
prone not only to error and bad judgment but also to evil. To
protect against serious and irreversible though improbable risks,
65. Id. §7191(c).
66. See, Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958).
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undue restrictions have been imposed. The legislature empha-
sized that the procedures established by the Natural Death Act
do not facilitate suicide or condone euthanasia or mercy killing 7
It is also stressed that the physicians who carry out a valid direc-
tive are not killing or murdering their patients. But the very fact
that such disclaimers are included attests to the sensitivity of the
legislators to possible appearances of impropriety.
C. Value of the Natural Death Act
Notwithstanding the numerous problems of interpretation and
application of the Natural Death Act, it is important to realize
that its primary significance at the present time may lie in its
symbolic value. For patients, it pays tribute to self-determination
and the right to control medical decisions. For physicians, it at-
tempts to remove uncertainties about legal liability for carrying
out the desires of patients. The immediate practical effect of the
Natural Death Act may be limited; it provides only minimal
operative force to individual rights and confronts physicians with
new uncertainties. Once the principles are firmly established,
however, the practical task of making them effective can be ac-
complished through public and scholarly discussion, judicial clar-
ification and legislative amendment. An eloquent statement of
this point of view was formulated by Alfred North Whitehead:
It is the first step in sociological wisdom, to recognize that the
major advances in civilization are processes which all but wreck
the societies in which they occur:-like unto an arrow in the
hand of a child. The art of free society consists first in the
maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness
of revision, to secure that the code serves those purposes which
satisfy an enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot
combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision,
must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the slow
atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows."
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§7192(a), 7195.
68. A. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM 88 (1927). Although the foregoing argument is powerful
and tempting, perhaps a distinction should be made between symbolic value for patients
and physicians and a broader notion of the symbolic value of the Natural Death Act. If
the arguments presented in preceding sections of the Article are sound, then the Natural
Death Act as it now stands provides little comfort for troubled patients or concerned
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Thus, the Natural Death Act may be viewed as a symbolic ges-
ture of human desires to control medical technology and to con-
front death.
One final way to assess whether the Natural Death Act is
merely an empty gesture or a useful legal instrument is to view
it also as a political, psychological and legal experiment. It is a
political experiment because it was the first legislation of its kind
to be passed in the United States, thus breaking a stalemate that
has existed in numerous state legislatures. Other states have al-
ready turned to California for guidance."
The Natural Death Act also invites some innovative psycholog-
ical research. Analysis of the Act's implementation may reveal
whether it encourages persons to be more willing to confront the
fact of death or whether it facilitates their denial of death. Re-
search will show also whether the Natural Death Act affects the
physician-patient relationship7' or whether it has an impact on
family relationships, hospital care or the manner in which per-
sons will choose to die.
The Natural Death Act is also a legal experiment which tests
the limits of legal effectiveness. Because we live in a legalistic
society which operates as if there is a practical legal solution to
most human problems, many perplexing human problems are
brought eventually into a legal forum. The problems of life pro-
physicians. It remains to be seen whether "fearlessness of revision," which is clearly
needed to expand patients' rights or clarify physicians' responsibilities will be forthcom-
ing.
69. By late 1977, over forty states had considered similar legislation, and in at least six
states (Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon and Texas) such legislation has
been signed into law. Whether anyone will exploit the opportunity to study seriously and
systematically the social and psychological impact of these novel political experiments in
a timely manner is uncertain.
70. One could argue that the felt need for such legislation is so widespread because the
physician-patient relationship has already changed dramatically, if not deteriorated.
Many patients feel that it is very difficult to communicate with their physicians, espe-
cially with regard to life-threatening illnesses; others do not trust physicians to carry out
their desires. The problems are compounded because in an age of assembly-line and
specialized medical care, many patients do not have personal physicians. Many physi-
cians are troubled by the spectre of malpractice litigation; others are uncomfortable with
patients' desires, if not demands, for more information about their bodily condition.
Physicians are uncertain whether to respond to their patients as potential plaintiffs,
adults in a state of regression to childlike dependence, informed consumers, contractees,
partners, or autonomous moral agents. The roles and responsibilities of patient and physi-
cian are no longer reducible to simple pictures. It is necessary to view them as complex
collages which are an unstable mixture of shifting attitudes, changing beliefs, and revised
values.
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longed without benefit by artificial means may require subtle,
sensitive and complex responses which cannot always be forced
into a Procrustean legal bed.
Legal effectiveness ultimately depends upon the strength and
clarity of the interests which law instrumentally serves. Our am-
bivalence toward technology and death as well as the perpetual
tension between individual freedom and paternalism undermines
a satisfactory legal solution to the problems the Natural Death
Act addresses. Because such forces are uncertain and unstable,
legal doctrines founded upon them will be controversial and im-
permanent. In the words of Ernest Becker,
In times such as ours there is a great pressure to come up with
concepts that help men understand their dilemma; there is an
urge toward vital ideas, toward a simplification of needless in-
tellectual complexity. Sometimes this makes for big lies that
resolve tensions and make it easy for action to move forward
with just the rationalizations that people need. But it also
makes for the slow disengagement of truths that help men get a
grip on what is happening to them, that tell them where the
problems really are.7"
The Natural Death Act is but a pale reflection of emotional and
philosophical conflicts which are inevitable results of attempts to
control technology and to overcome death. It reiterates but does
not resolve our ambivalence.
71. E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 1 (1974).
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APPENDIX
THE NATURAL DEATH AcT
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1977).
7185. This act shall be known and may be cited as the Natural Death Act.
7186. The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to control
the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision
to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condi-
tion.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technology has made possible the
artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual autonomy,
such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may cause loss of patient
dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary
or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in the medical
and legal professions as to the legality of terminating the use or application of life-
sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in sound mind evidenced a
desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect, the
Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California shall recognize the right
of an adult person to make a written directive instructing his physician to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
7187. The following definitions shall govern the construction of this chapter:
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected by, or assigned to, the patient
who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(b) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily executed by the declarant in
accordance with the requirements of Section 7188. The directive, or a copy of the directive,
shall be made part of the patient's medical records.
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or intervention which
utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital func-
tion, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to artificially prolong
the moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death is
imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure" shall
not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure
deemed necessary to alleviate pain.
(d) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed by the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance or the Board of Osteopathic Examiners.
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be af-
flicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of whom shall be the attending
physician, who have personally examined the patient.
(f) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within
reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient.
7188. Any adult person may execute a directive directing the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed
by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by blood or
marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon
his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then existing or, at the time
of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In addition, a witness to a directive
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shall not be the attending physician, an employee of the attending physician or a health
facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim against any
portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease at the time of the execution of the
directive. The directive shall be in the following form:
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this - day of - (month, year).
I -, being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make known my desire that my
life shall not be artifically prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, do hereby
declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to be a
terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of life-sustaining proce-
dures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my
physician determines that my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures
are utilized, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permit-
ted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-
sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by my family
and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical
treatment and accept the consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my physician,
this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a terminal condi-
tion by __ , M.D., whose address is -, and whose telephone number is _. I under-
stand that if I have not filled in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed
that I did not have a terminal condition when I made out this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this directive.
Signed.
City, County and State of Residence -
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to be of sound
mind.
Witness._
Witness.
7188.5. A directive shall have no force or effect if the declarant is a patient in a skilled
nursing facility as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1250 at the time the directive is
executed unless one of the two witnesses to the directive is a patient advocate or ombuds-
man as may be designated by the State Department of Aging for this purpose pursuant
to any other applicable provision of law. The patient advocate or ombudsman shall have
the same qualifications as a witness under Section 7188.
The intent of this section is to recognize that some patients in skilled nursing facilities
may be so insulated from a voluntary decisionmaking role, by virtue of the custodial
nature of their care, as to require special assurance that they are capable of willfully and
voluntarily executing a directive.
7189. (a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the declarant, without regard to
his mental state or competency, by any of the following methods:
(1) By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, or burnt, torn, or otherwise destroyed by
the declarant or by some person in his presence and by his direction.
(2) By a written revocation of the declarant expressing his intent to revoke, signed and
dated by the declarant. Such revocation shall become effective only upon communication
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to the attending physician by the declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the declar-
ant. The attending physician shall record in the patient's medical record the time and
date when he received notification of the written revocation.
(3) By a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent to revoke the directive. Such
revocation shall become effective only upon communication to the attending physician by
the declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician
shall record in the patient's medical record the time, date, and place of the revocation
and the time, date, and place, if different, of when he received notification of the revoca-
tion.
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for failure to
act upon a revocation made pursuant to this section unless that person has actual knowl-
edge of the revocation.
7189.5. A directive shall be effective for five years from the date of execution thereof
unless sooner revoked in a manner prescribed in Section 7189. Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to prevent a declarant from reexecuting a directive at any time in
accordance with the formalities of Section 7188, including reexecution subsequent to a
diagnosis of a terminal condition. If the declarant has executed more than one directive,
such time shall be determined from the date of execution of the last directive known to
the attending physician. If the declarant becomes comatose or is rendered incapable of
communicating with the attending physician, the directive shall remain in effect for the
duration of the comatose condition or until such time as the declarant's condition renders
him or her able to communicate with the attending physician.
7190. No physician or health facility which, acting in accordance with the require-
ments of this chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No licensed health
professional, acting under the direction of a physician, who participates in the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician, or licensed health professional
acting under the direction of a physician, who participates in the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall
be guilty of any criminal act or of unprofessional conduct.
7191. (a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient pursuant to the directive, the attending physician shall determine
that the directive complies with Section 7188, and, if the patient is mentally competent,
that the directive and all steps proposed by the attending physician to be undertaken are
in accord with the desires of the qualified patient.
(b) If the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or
reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless revoked, to
be the directions of the patient regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures. No physician, and no licensed health professional acting under the direction
of a physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of
the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision. A failure by a physician to effectuate
the directive of a qualified patient pursuant to this division shall constitute unprofessional
conduct if the physician refuses to make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the
necessary steps, to effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who
will effectuate the directive of the qualified patient.
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subsequent to executing the directive,
and has not subsequently reexecuted the directive, the attending physician may give
weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's directions regarding the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures and may consider other factors, such as infor-
mation from the affected family or the nature of the patient's illness, injury, or disease,
in determining whether the totality of circumstances known to the attending physician
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justify effectuating the directive. No physician, and no licensed health professional acting
under the direction of a physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effec-
tuate the directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision.
7192. (a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a quali-
fied patient in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall not, for any purpose,
constitute a suicide.
(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Section 7188 shall not restrict, inhibit, or
impair in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance,
nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No policy
of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwith-
standing any term of the policy to the contrary.
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provider, and no health care service
plan, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit plan, or
nonprofit hospital service plan, shall require any person to execute a directive as a condi-
tion for being insured for, or receiving, health care services.
7193. Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal respon-
sibility which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of this chapter
are cumulative.
7194. Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliterates, or damages the
directive of another without such declarant's consent shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Any person who, except where justified or excused by law, falsifies or forges the directive
of another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation as pro-
vided in Section 7189, with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of any
such act, directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death
to thereby be hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide as provided
in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 of the Penal Code.
7195. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve
mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other
than to permit the natural process of dying as provided in this chapter.
SEC. 2. If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of
the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this
end the provisions of this act are severable.
SEC. 3. Notwithstanding Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, there shall
be no reimbursement pursuant to this section nor shall there be any appropriation made
by this act because the Legislature recognized that during any legislative session a variety
of changes to laws relating to crimes and infractions may cause both increased and de-
creased costs to local government entities and school districts which, in the aggregate, do
not result in significant identifiable cost changes.
